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Statistical limits to Equity
Daniel Badagnani
abstract
We derive the most probable distribution of resources for a simple society.
We find that a probabilistic analysis forbids both too much and too less
equity, and selects instead a minimally ordered state. We give the detailed
calculations for a special model where the population and resources are
fixed, and resources are owned only by individuals. We show that in general
the equity is greater whenever the volume of the indifference manifold grows
faster as a function of individual rent.
1 Introduction
Maybe the central task of the whole economical science is the clever ad-
ministration of the resources of a society in order for everyone to fullfill their
material needs. It is thus interesting the question of to what extent one could,
in principle, distribute richness with equity. At first sight, it seems perfectly
conceivable (altough higly uthopic) a society in wich everyone access exactly
the same ’ammount of richness’. Is there some conceivable bound to get such
a setting? Well, suppose we begin distributting goods to N people: there is
just one ’configuration’ in wich everyone receives exactly the same ammount
of any good. If one decide being unfair by beneffiting just someone, there are
N ways to do so (one for every beneffited person). One can see that as we
increase the ’unfairness’, the number of possible configurations grow fastly.
Thus, if we ’prepare the system’ to be fair at the begining, by exchange it
will disorder with litle probability of reordering. This reasoning puts a bound
also on the unfairness: a few too welth people and the rest with nothing is
again an ordered state.
Here we will give the detailed mathematics for a ’dilute’ society, for wich
the following postulates holds:
1. The population N remains fixed
2. There is a fixed ammount of richness, R
1
3. There are only individual patrimonia
Under these simplifications, we will find that we can find the probability
distribution for individual wealthiness, giving a precise meaning to the above
discussion. We will find the number of states for detailed distributions giving
rise to the same global state (overall ’unfairness’). Those who know statis-
tical mechanics will find a very close resemblance with ideal gases. Notice,
however, that the following is not an analogy: everything is derived under the
given and a few more assumptions. That much of the derivations are formally
identical is quite amusing, but not that surprising once one realizes that both
are statistics on the ways one can distribute something indestructible among
a fixed number of ’objects’.
The conclussions drawn from this model are quite limited: richness is
created and destroyed, populations change and in complex societies large
ammounts of resourses belongs to ’composite objects’ like associations, cor-
porations or even the whole society (’large range interactions’). Even more
seriously, actual societies are away from statistical equilibrium: there is a
typical ’relaxation time’ needed for the society to exchange goods untill it
gets to an equilibrium, but growth (especially sectorial growth) ussually hap-
pens in shorter periods, so equilibrium is not reached. We know from other
disciplines that systems far away from equilibrium can get extremely striking
complexity (life being a paradigmatic thermodynamical example). Anyway,
analyzing what happens at equilibrium is the mandatory begining, and very
important conclussions are available at this primitive stage.
2 Partition of resourses: the distribution func-
tion
For clarity, we will suppose that each individual can have any patrimonium
from a discrete set r1, r2, ..., rk. Every ri could be composed of many com-
binations of different goods, say there are gi such combinations for each ri.
We also suppose that any ’microscopical state’ (any specific combination of
goods) is accesible with equal probability for every individual (’fair rules’).
We will call ni to the number of people owning ri each. Recall that the total
population is N and the total wealthiness is R. We have the bounds
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N = n1 + n2 + ... + nk (1)
R = n1r1 + n2r2 + ...+ nkrk (2)
We will count the total number of configurations and find which is the
most probable distribution (that is, the n(r) having the maximum amount
of states). First, notice that we can fill the state r1 with one person in Ngi
ways, then we have N−1 remaining persons to accomodate. Once ni persons
have been placed into an ri we must remember to divide by the ni! ways one
does so, and we are left with
Ω =
N !gn11 ...g
nk
k
n1!...nk!
(3)
We now suppose that there are lots of ni’s at each ri level, and we take
them to be continuous. For each ri we will find an ni (we will call it n(ri))
wich maximizes 3 subject to the bounds 1 and 2. In order to do so, we
introduce the bounds as Lagrange multipliers, and extremize
S = ln(Ω) +α(N − n1− n2− ...− nk) + β(R− n1r1− n2r2− ...− nkrk) (4)
In ln(Ω) we use Stirling formula. We get then
∂S
∂ni
= ln(gi)− ln(ni)− α− βri = 0 (5)
while the conditions ∂S
∂α
and ∂S
∂β
just imposes the bounds. Thus we have got
a Boltzman-like distribution for richness
n(r) = gie
−αe−βr (6)
with α and β determined by the conditions
N = e−α
∑
r
e−βr
R = e−α
∑
r
re−βr
3
3 Particular models
Lets consider some concrete distributions in order to see what do we have
here. The above distribution will be considered continuous, that is, n(r)
means that there are n(r)dr individuals with patrimonia between r and r+dr.
Then, since the probability is exponentially damped, we will forget to bound
r and we will take it to range between zero and infinity (in fact, it couldnt
exeed R, but the probability of being R while one expect it to be about R/N
is about e−N , that is, astronomically small). We do this because it is much
easier to calculate. The distribution is thus
n(r) = g(r)e−αe−βr
In order to give a g(r) we will consider that we have m goods whose
unitary price is much cheaper that the mean wealthy (we will clarify this
somewhat dark condition below) so we can think that we have a continuum
of goods. For a given r we have an indifference hipersurface such that r =
r1+ ...+rm (ri being the price of the ammount of the i-th good owned by the
individual). So, g(r) is proportional to the (m-1)-dimmensional volume of
the hypersurface: S(r) =
√
mrm−1. That surface is an hyperplane bounded
by the walls defined by ri = 0, and its ’volume’ is of the form Cr
m−1. So we
take as our distribution
n(r) = Crm−1e−αe−βr (7)
Let us first solve for the parameters α and β. We have
N = Ce−α
∫
∞
0
rm−1e−βrdr
R = Ce−α
∫
∞
0
rme−βrdr
This gives the result
n(r) =
N
(m− 1)!
(
m
r¯
)m
rm−1e−mNr/R (8)
where r¯ = R/N is the mean rent per capita. From 8 we can tell what is the
condition for low unitary prices: we mean that every price should be much
lower than R
mN
. If one has many prices independent of R, as R grows we
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should include more and more goods, so m depends indeed on R. We see
that the more goods available, the more peaky will the distribution be. As
m grows, the position of the peak approach from below the rent per capita
R/N . The variance for the individual rent (that is rougly the dispersion of
income) is
∆r =
1
√
m
R
N
(9)
4 General Discussion
For computational ease, we solved for an artificially simple example in wich
any good could be obtained from any combination summing the same price.
In general, however, one should have an ’indifference manifold’ whose volume
will in general depend on the income. What is important for the calculations
above is the ’dispersion relation’ connecting the individual rent and the vol-
ume of the indifference manifold. If it follows a power law V = Crm, all the
above applies includding the calculation for the dispersion. It shows that
equity will grow if the elasticity m grows.
We have shown that a closed economy at equilibrium cannot be perfectly
fair. Anyway, a complex society with large individual rent and large diversity
can reach a state quite close to equity. On the other hand, subsistence
economies in wich only a few goods are exchanged are mostly compossed of
poor individuals.
An important remark on fluctuations is in order here: the ’ocupation
density’ d = n(r)/N will indeed fluctuate around the distribution found, and
one should wonder how often it will differ appreciably from that distribution.
If the answer is ’very often’, then all the analysis done is nearly useless.
The answer is found by calculating the standard deviation ∆d, which is
found to be d/
√
N . One could be tempted to take N = 6000000000, but
it must be remembered that larger populations have larger time relaxations,
depending on the intensity of the trade exchange. That time for an entire
continent would probably be many years, so normal succeses impeed reaching
equilibrium. Where interchange is strong enough in order to have a somewhat
small relaxation time is inside a country, a city, etc where population is
tipically a few million people, so fluctuations in d can be estimated in 10−3
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of d, wich is quite small. However, economies are continuously changing, and
are surely much away from equilibrium.
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